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KENT GREENAWALT'S ELUSIVE 
CONSTITUTION 
Steven D. Smith* 
In his magisterial opus which culminates with Religion and 
the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness, 1 Kent Greenawalt 
makes claims-many of them-about what "the Constitution" 
forbids, permits, and demands. But what conception of "the 
Constitution," or of constitutional interpretation, informs these 
claims? It is easier, I think, to say what Greenawalt's conception 
is not than to say what it is. 
Original meaning? It is clear, for example, that Greenawalt 
is not relying on an originalist conception. He tells us so: original 
meaning is something to consider, but it is not determinative.' 
His second chapter, which offers an extended discussion of the 
original meaning of the establishment clause, might mislead an 
inattentive reader. Greenawalt's purpose in this chapter is de-
fensive: he attempts to say not so much what the original mean-
ing was, but what it was not. 
More specifically, he criticizes at length the interpretation 
(proposed in various versions by, among others, Justice Thomas, 
Akhil Amar, and myself) which holds that the enactors did not 
mean to adopt any substantive principle of religious freedom. In-
stead, they basically intended to confirm what virtually everyone 
at the time agreed on-namely, that the matter of "establish-
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ment of religion" would remain within the jurisdiction of the 
states, not the national government. If accepted, this interpreta-
tion could be embarrassing to the more expansive constitutional 
jurisprudence favored by many today-including Greenawalt, 
who accordingly resists the jurisdictional interpretation. 
Whether or not his conclusions are correct in this respect: 
however, nothing in his project hinges on these questions. In his 
own analyses of establishment clause controversies, Greenawalt 
does not rely on original meaning for support; on the contrary, 
he concedes that much in modern establishment clause jurispru-
dence. and many of his own conclusions, are at odds with the 
understandings and expectations of the Framers.5 Indeed, 
Greenawalt's bottom line on original meaning is almost star-
tlingly negative in character: 
The modern Supreme Court's treatment of the scope of the 
religion clauses cannot be justified on originalist grounds .... 
But the latitude with which the Supreme Court has departed 
from these original understandings is no greater than it has 
exhibited with other parts of the First Amendment and with 
other guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Whatever bases one 
may have to criticize the Supreme Court's religion clause ju-
risprudence. it is not distinctly unfaithful to original under-
standings (pp. 38-39). 
Text plus precedent? Greenawalt rejects originalism because 
he thinks courts need to be able to develop constitutional mean-
ings "in light of changing social conditions and evolving moral 
and political premises" (p. 193). This emphasis on the need for 
judicially evolved meanings, together with Greenawalt's exten-
sive and careful attention to the Supreme Court's modern case 
law, might suggest that he adopts the common lawyerly view that 
"the Constitution'' consists of the text plus judicial precedent. 
But this reading seems mistaken. In fact, though he is gen-
erally sympathetic to the Supreme Court's doctrine and deci-
sions. Greenawalt is also highly critical of some precedents,6 and 
4. For what it is worth. I think Greenawalt's conclusions are plausible but not the 
most plausible interpretation of the original meaning. For a lengthy defense of the juris-
dictional interpretation against the objections of Greenawalt and others. see Steven D. 
Smith. The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal. 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1843 (2006). 
5. Greenawalt acknowledges that "the founders would have accepted various 
measures that had a religious purpose and a main effect of supporting religion" (p. 76: 
see also pp. 38. 3Y. 65 ). 
6. For example. Greenawalt criticizes the decisions in Rosenberger v Regents. 
which ruled that a Christian newspaper should not be excluded from a university pro-
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indeed of whole lines of precedent. For example, he opposes the 
trend toward allowing greater financial aid to religious schools 
(pp. 400-24). So it seems that some judicially evolved meanings 
are consistent with "the Constitution" and some are not. Clearly 
"the Constitution" for Greenawalt somehow subsists independ-
ent of precedent. 
Tradition? If the evolving constitutional meanings are not to 
be supplied by precedent, then perhaps they derive from some-
thing more intangible but also more earthy and democratic-
something like the "traditions and collective conscience" of the 
American people? Greenawalt says more than once that consti-
tutional law ought to be congruent with culture and traditions.7 
And he occasionally defers to traditions that he plainly thinks 
are in principle undesirable or unconstitutional, such as the tra-
dition of "mild endorsements" of religion (p. 540). 
Nonetheless. Greenawalt never actually attempts to show 
how his views and prescriptions flow from any deliberate or de-
veloped interpretation of the American political tradition. Nor 
could he, I suspect. That is because, by-and-large, Greenawalt's 
commitments run strongly contrary to pervasive and well-
entrenched American traditions. We might put the point this 
way: although he attempts fairly to represent all sides, and al-
though he comes closer to achieving a fair presentation than al-
most any contemporary scholar could do, still, in the end. 
Greenawalt consistently comes down on what James Davison 
Hunter described as the secular, "progressive'' side in the culture 
wars and against the more tradition-oriented side.~ 
Thus, Greenawalt comes close to being categorical in insist-
ing that government (as opposed to ordinary citizens) cannot 
make, express. or act on theological judgments or religious be-
liefs (pp. 57, 190, 195, 492-93, 523-24). This proscription would 
have the effect of repudiating. or at least rendering suspect, the 
longstanding American tradition-one honored over the years 
by all branches of government (executive, legislative. judicial) 
and all levels of government (federal, state. local)-of including 
gram subsidizing student publications (pp. 203-04). and in Zorach v. Clauson. which up-
held an off-premises ··release time·· program of religious instruction for public school 
students (pp. 67-68). 
7. See, e.g.. GREENAWALT. FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS. supra note I. at 4 ( .. ! 
will be making claims that rest on the country's political and legal traditions and on un-
deniable facts about its present condition ... ). 
8. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER. CULTURE WARS: THE STRLGGLE TO DEFINE 
AMERICA (1992). 
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religious language in enactments, displays, and official proclama-
tions of various sorts.9 Nearly every state constitution expresses 
deference to a being denominated "God," "Almighty God," "the 
Supreme Ruler of the Universe," or ''the Sovereign Ruler of the 
Universe" 10: Greenawalt says that all of these expressions are 
probably unconstitutional (p. 65 n.27). And every President has 
included religious language in an Inaugural Address11 : this prac-
tice would also seem to transgress Greenawalt's constitutional 
principles. Thus, it seems that on Greenawalt's view, Lincoln's 
much revered Second Inaugural Address ("with malice toward 
none, with charity for all") should be sandblasted off the wall of 
the Lincoln Memorial: the speech was, as one historian ob-
served, a "theological classic," containing "fourteen references 
to God, many scriptural allusions, and four direct quotations 
from the Bible. "1c 
But perhaps Greenawalt is not so much interested in tradi-
tion as reflected in past expressions and facts, but rather in what 
sort of political community tradition has made us into, now. To 
be sure, past luminaries like Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln 
routinely invoked God in their official declarations. But tradi-
tion is an evolving matter, and by now and in our more secular 
and diverse society we understand that such expressions are divi-
sive and inappropriate. 11 Don't we? 
Well, actually, no: we don't-not unless the "we" is under-
stood to refer a smaller and more select fellowship (like, say, de-
vout readers of the New York Times?). Thus, a more present-
9. For a collection of such expressions, see JOHN T. NOONAN. JR. & EDWARD 
MCGLYNN GAFFNEY. JR .. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES. AND OTHER 
MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 201-08. 210-12. 
308-12 (2001). 
10. For a compilation, see WILLIAM J. FEDERER. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND 
THEIR INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN LAW 52-55 (2003). The United States Constitution is 
importantly different in this respect. For consideration of the significance of the national 
Constitution's agnosticism. see Steven D. Smith. Our Agnostic Constitwion. 83 NYU L. 
Rev. 120 (2008). 
II. FEDERER. supra note 10. at 49-51. 
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countrv's founding. are contained in the Declaration of Independence. and remain in 
manv itate constitutions. nevertheless government should not now make formal. serious 
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oriented approach to tradition might help Greenawalt a little, 
but not much. It may be that objections to governmental reli-
gious expression are more widespread today than in the past. 
But such objections do not yet amount to anything like a domi-
nant or consensus position. Presidents and other public figures 
still routinely invoke God in their official speeches and declara-
tions. Despite judicial efforts to censor such expression, states 
and local communities still actively assert their right, as commu-
nities, to maintain religious symbols and expressions of various 
sorts: the host of cases about Ten Commandments monuments 
are evidence of this sentiment. 1 ~ A Circuit Court that tries to ex-
cise the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance still 
calls forth a torrent of bipartisan outrage. 
Theory? Another possibility might be that Greenawalt is 
appealing to some sort of Dworkinian Constitution, in which 
constitutional meaning is obtained by interpreting the materials 
in accordance with the best available political-moral theory. 15 
But in fact Greenawalt seems decidedly ambivalent about 
whether any such theory is even possible. He insists, repeatedly, 
that the religion clauses cannot be understood in terms of "any 
single formula or set of formulas" (p. 432). And he finds inade-
quate the leading examples of more theoryish approaches that 
he considers- the "substantive neutrality" of Douglas Laycock 
and Michael McConnell, and Christopher Eisgruber's and Law-
rence Sager's "equal liberty" approach (pp. 451-56, 462-79). 
To be sure, Greenawalt sometimes suggests that a satisfac-
tory theory of religious freedom might be devisable (p. 436), and 
he devotes a chapter to the refutation of "religion clause skep-
tics" (such as myself) who doubt the possibility of any such the-
ory. Here he confronts the objection which asserts that any such 
theory would necessarily depend on judgments about more ulti-
mate and contested matters, such as the nature and purpose of 
government. human nature and, most crucially, the nature and 
truth of religion. Greenawalt concedes the point, but suggests 
that it is in principle possible to investigate such matters and 
make informed judgments about them (pp. 442, 446). 
This suggestion seems plausible (at least if the "in principle" 
is heavily underscored): still, this response to theory skepticism 
seems curious coming from Greenawalt, since his virtually cate-
14. See, e.g.. Van Orden v. Perry. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
15. Dworkin's most extensive argument for this view is in RONALD DWORKIN. 
LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
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gorical insistence that government must not act on the basis of 
theological judgments would seem to forbid such an investiga-
tion, at least for purposes of developing a theory that would gov-
ern governmental behavior. Indeed, Greenawalt reiterates in 
this chapter that he "agree[ s] with Smith that any theory that 
judges and other officials are directly to employ cannot be based 
on an assumption that any particular religious view is correct" 
(p. 449). 1" But unless the qualifiers ''directly'' and "particular" 
are made to do a good deal of work, this prohibition precludes 
precisely the determinations about background beliefs that 
Greenawalt seemed to be recommending as a possible basis for a 
governing theory. 
Whether or not a theory of religious freedom is possible in 
principle, however, it is clear that Greenawalt himself proposes 
no such theory. His approach is not "theory down'' but rather 
''bottom up," as he says. So it seems that Greenawalt is not em-
ploying a Dworkinian Constitution in reaching his various con-
clusions. 
Justice, fairness, prudence? So if Greenawalt is not using an 
originalist conception of the Constitution, or a "text plus prece-
dent" conception, or a tradition-rooted conception, or a Dwork-
inian theory-oriented conception, then what sort of Constitution 
is Greenawalt invoking as he declares that the Constitution per-
mits some things and forbids other things? 
Sometimes Greenawalt almost seems to equate what the 
Constitution ostensibly demands with ''what ought to be done, 
all things considered. " 17 At other times, though, Greenawalt ex-
plicitly distinguishes between constitutional demands and the 
prescriptions of prudence or fairness. 1 ~ But he offers no clear ex-
16. Mv own claim. actuallv. is not that officials ""cannot"" act on such assumptions 
either in th~ sense that they are-incapable of doing so or in the sense that they are some-
how constitutionally forbidden to do so. On the contrary. I think that government ulti-
mately cannot avoid making judgments about theological issues. See, e.g .. Steven D. 
Smith. Barnette's Big Blunder. 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625. 653-58 (2003). The claim. 
rather. is that if governments determine the scope for religious choice in accordance with 
judgments that accept some religious beliefs and reject others. they are not be acting in 
accordance with a ""theory of religious freedom"" of the sort that modern thinkers have 
aspired to provide. See STEVEN D. SMITH. GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL 
DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOL:S FREEDOM IN AMERICA 45-57 (2001). 
17. Thus. after presenting a highly nuanced discussion of how religion should and 
should not be treated in the public school curriculum (pp. 122-34). Greenawalt asserts 
that ""constitutionally permissible teaching largely coheres with what I have claimed is 
appropriate or desirable teaching .. ( p. 134 ). 
18. See, e.g .. p. 240 (contrasting ""constitutionality"" with ""legislative and judicial 
wisdom""): pp. 280. 284 (contrasting ""policy considerations"" with ""constitutional princi-
ples""). 
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planation- none that I could discern, at least- of how this dis-
tinction is being drawn. 
Does it matter? Of course, Greenawalt is hardly the only 
constitutionalist around who declines to propose a clear account 
of how the Constitution gets its meaning. And in any case. I am 
hardly in a position to cast the first stone. Moreover, the absence 
of any clear account of what "the Constitution" is might be un-
objectionable-it might be just a piece of commendable real-
ism- except for the fact that Greenawalt expects "the Constitu-
tion," and the judiciary, to play such a major role in the 
disposition of religious freedom controversies. 
Thus, one can imagine a view that would hold that because 
the original meaning of the establishment clause is unascertain-
able or no longer germane, and in the absence of a satisfying al-
ternative account of just how constitutional meaning is created, 
controversies about religious freedom ought normally to be set-
tled without invoking commands or prohibitions supposedly 
emanating from "the Constitution.'' This conclusion might in 
turn entail that the courts should have a relatively modest role in 
effecting or imposing such settlements. 
But this is clearly not Greenawalt's view. On the contrary, 
he envisions an expansive Constitution and an active. intensive 
supervisory role for the courts. And so the absence of any clear 
account of what "the Constitution" is and where its meaning 
comes from is troubling. 
